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It was :~y intention in this thesis '.m
of the chronological steps in the development of the present refer
Organization of the United States? however, I found it very difficult
to keep this objective view during the course of my research and writ-
ing. Being a part of the ?Javy, I found itself talcing the ITavy side
in the fight over unification, and being an admirer of the late ?ir.
Forrestal, I found myself talcing his side. Although . ias of mine
dominated my hinYing, I tried not to let it dominate my -writing. In
short, I tried to present the facts as I saw them and not as I -would
like to have seen them through eyes blurred rath bias, loyalty and
prejudice.
The bibliography is not meant to be all-inclaisive, as a large
volume of material has been written on the subject, especially the
unification phase. I found considerable of the material had been
heavily slanted toward either the Army or Havy view. I selected only
sufficient background material to bring out the basic issues and oppos-
ing viewpoints in each step of the evolution of the Defense Organization.
Ify purpose in writing this thesis was twofold: first, to satisfy
one of the requirements for a Master's Degree, and second, to build a
background of knowledge and to set a point of departure from -which to
9
study the "Evolution of the Organization of the Navy Department,"
which I intend to propose as my second term thesis.




I "was brought Into contact vuth the Organizations of Defense, Arry and
Air Force, as a result of :;y duties in opnav and additional duty on
the staff of the Joint Cliiefs of Staff, Fi contact grew a de-
sire to bettor onders oand the Organ! 3 of Defense, Ar.y and Air





The Departaient of Defense Organization of the United Str-tes, -.3
it is fctoivn today, has developed Ib four be. sic steos. These ilestones
of evolution ar
1. Pre World War H organisation
2. World War II wwaej or tion
3. Unification
U. Post Unifier tion modifier-; ions
The early history of the national defense organisation is both
led and colorful. S-irprisingly enough, vro had unification at the
beginning, "when the llavy "was under t" DeT>artnant«
Houever, the nost important precedent set at the beginning of our
National Defense Organization tjts that of civilian control. Civilian
leadership over our rllitary forces "was orovided by the Constitution:
"The President shall be Conraander in Chief of the Amy and Navy of the
Urlted States, and of the rilitia of the several states, -when called
into the actual service of the United States."1/ In addition to this
Constitutional provision, George Washington extended civilian control
by appointing a civilian as the first Secretary of War, The principle
of civilian control of the adlitary has continued to this day in all
aspects of the Defense Departrnent Organization. This principle has
been the major motivating influence in the evolution of the Departinent




of Defense Organisation. As will be seen in Chapter IV, this principle
not only motivated for unification, but at the same tine mitigated
against unlf .-
'.th the as "neat of the Ik. rate Depa, , the
history of tl ;nse Organization until Fori II is the history
of the separate Departments of War and Ilavy.
The second"", rase of the evolution af '.onal Defense Organi-
zation occurred during World Far II -when unification had its beginning
in fact if not . ident Roosevelt appointed Admiral William
D. Leahy as the Chief or Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, to assist him
in co-ordiriating the ;dlitary efforts of the War and Navy Dop; rt::ents.
A second ::iajor step towards unification during this phase t;es the estab-
lishment of and successful operation of unified commands of ground, air
and naval forces. A third major step during this please was the gradual
evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other s^eps during this phase
were taken in the creation of government agencies, such as tl Prod-
uction Board, to integrate the ;dLlitary effort with the civilian effort.
The third phase in the evolution of the Defense Organization was
the debate on Unification in 19U£-6-7 vita the eventual passing of the
National Security Act of 19k7. The basic features of the Act stemmed
from the Eberstadt Report which was prepared by the requesL of Secretary
of the ilavy Forrcstal. The Act established the National "Military SJstab-
lishiaent with a Secretary of Defense as a coordinator, and three Depart-
ments of Any, Navy and Air with Secretaries as Cabinet members with
direct access to the President. In addition, the Act created the Depart-
awrt of Air Force, National Security Council, the Central Intelligence
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Agency, tlie National Securities Resources Board, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Joint Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Dev-
elopment Board. Several of the above had been in existence and merely
had their names Changed or Trere legally recognised. The national
Security Act of Ijhl ras an epoch rdlestone in the history of the De-
fense Organization of this country.
The fourth and final phase in the develo I cat of our Defense Org-
anization is the post unification period (19U7 to date) in -shich the
Hational Security Act of 19k7 has been inodified by the amendments of
19U9 and 19£2 and the Reorganization Plan Number Six of 30 June 19^3.
The major effect of these amendments has been to increase the civilian
control over the military by centralization of more power in the office
of the Secretary of Defense. Of major interest to the Navy Graduate
Coraptrollership Class is the addition of the Comptrollership function
in the Defense Organisation by the addition of the Title IV to the
National Security Act of 19U7.
.
Chapter H
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
The Defense Organisation of the United States prior to World War II
•was a twe-departnient system co; posed of the War and Navy Departments
with the exception of a short period in the early history of the country
(1789 to 1797) "when the War Department contained both the Any and the
Navy. Thus the history of the Defense Organization prior to world War
II is the separate histories of the War and Navy Departments. An Im-
portant exception to this generalization is the establishment of the
philosophy of civilian control of the military organization as noted
in Chapter I.
In general, the history of the War Department -was an evolutionary
process accelerated by -wars in which a decentralised organization -was
centralised under the general staff concept. XSajor General Nelson has
fully chronicled this evolution in his excellent book, "National Secur-
ity and the General Staff. B A resume 1 of his views on this evolution
are quoted:
^Throughout our nation's history, our organisation for national
defense has been so shackled in the grip of the past, that at times
nothing short of catastrophe could release it. It took the disgraceful
events of the Spanish-American War combined -with the heroic efforts of
a great Secretary of War, Elihu Root, to establish a General Staff to
plan for the future. And it took five years to put that basic idea
across. During World War I it was not until the "whole supply estab-




industrial nobHization under Bernard Baruch and the supply set-up in
the War Department and the Anry under General Goethals. After
''rorld
War I, it took "tero years and General Pershing 1 3 prestige to secure the
national Defense Act of 1920. In World War II, it took the I eerl Har-
bor tragedy to precipitate effective action to reorganize the War De-
partment and to constitute at lease a semblance of necessary top mach-
inery, the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization." '
The Navy Department has laintainad its decentralized organization
since the establishment of the bureau system in 13U2. The ?najor changes
in this organization have continued this po3.icy of decentralization
by creating the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations, Industrial
Relations, Naval Material, Naval Research, Judge Advocate Generrl,
General Counsel, Analysis and Revior-, Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserve,
and Co -ptroller.
A detailed history of the evolution of t; 7 Department Organi-
zation by the e~ inent naval historian S. E. Morison is given in Ferdi-
nand Eberstadt's book on the "Unification of the War and Navy Depart-
ments and Postwar Organisation for National Defense."
The organizational philosophy of the Arry, of centralized civilian
responsibility, authority and control in the Secretary of War, with the
single line of authority through the Chief of Staff, and the Navy organ-
izational philosophy of centralized civilian responsibility in the Sec-
retary of the Navy, -with decentralized authority and control in the
Major General Otto Lauren Nelson. Jr., U. S. Army (Ret.) -"Hat ion-
1




"vnrious bureaus and offices, rrith no single ! dJitaiy officer respon-
sibility, led to the difference of opinion as to hcr.v the Defense Org-
anisation o be unified. The Arcy Tranted a single Department of
Defense and the Nayy -wanted a Federation*




The Defense Organization at t! i :nt of World War II m t!ie
tw© separate Departments of War and Navy coordinated by the Resident
v/ith national policy leadership in the State Department* The shock of
Pearl Harbor changed this situation in two -rcaysj one "was the reorgani-
zation of the Navy and War Departments and the second was the establish-
ment of organisational machinery to coordinate the defense effort.
This frilure to be ready for World War II vrith a Defense Organization
capable of fighting it, set the stage for later demands for unification.
The Navy rtepartaient -sras the first to feel the change:
"King -Eras. • .summoned to Washington, and, arriving Tuesday rim-
ing, 16 December. • gwfl taken to the White House by the Secretary,
and two days later, on the eighteenth, President Roosevelt issued
ecutive Order 898I4. •Prescribing the Duties of the Comrrnc-er-in-Chief,
United States Fleet and the co-operative Duties of the Chief of Naval
Operations.'.
. •
"It provided that the Co:r!mander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
•shall have supreme command of the operating forces. • .and shall be
directly responsible, lznder the general direction of the Secretary of
the Navy, to the President of the United States. 1
"A radical change in naval administration was accomplished by this
order. As -will be recalled from earlier chapters, -he authority of the
Chief of Naval Operations, having never been precisely defined, had been




creating the office had provid T 11, vn m direction
of tlie Secretary, be charged with the operations of the fleet, and vdth
the preparation end readiness of plans for its use 1 . * But neither
thin larr, nor any subsequent one, tod given him authority over the bur-
eaus of the Havy Department that built, manned, supplied and maintained
the fleet. Durl ?re than a quarter of a century the great majority
of the Chiefs of Haval Operations had felt the inconsistency of this
situation, and had become convinced that the pa "9X1 of the offic3 should
extend over the activities of the bureaus.
". 1 .On 12 'larch, '.'resident Roosevelt icsued Executive Order 9096
providing that 'the duties of the Corr^ander-iii--(3hief, United States
Fleet, and the duties of the Chief of IJaval Operations ray be combined
and devolve on one officer* • ."who el '. :i 1 naval advisor
and executive to the Secretary of lavy on the conduct of the Haval
Establishment. • .As Chief of ZJaval Operations. • .shall be charged,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy. • .?rith the coordina-
tion and direction. . .of the bureaus and offices of the llavy Depart-
ment.^/
The IJavy Department continued to operate under these two executive
orders throughout the Trar as a highly centralized organization under
the Secretary and his military executive. Fleet Admiral King.
The Department of Tfar reorganised in 19hZ, in a si ffort to
translate into a -vvorkoblo v?artime organization.
rly February 19^2 also saw the evolution of organisational r/eans
3 E. J. King and W. M. Whitehill. "Fleet Admiral Xing," (Uevr York, W» W.
Norton and Company, Inc., 19^2) pp. 3U9-3£6
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to coordinate the defense effort. One of these actions established
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, An Army version of this evolution follows:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization emerged because some agency
of the sort was essential in our dealings with the British - and in de-
termining quickly over-all military policy and strategy. General liar-
shall accompanied the President in his meetings with the British Prirat
Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff in August I9lil and in December
I9I4I and January 19U2, Although admittedly an overstatement, there is
a basis for the allegation that the necessity for allied unity of action
and coordination forced the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces to devise
a speedier and riore effective seans of collaboration. Certainly Joint
Any-Kavy Boards did already exist but they -rare inadequate.
"Curiously, the organisation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff just
grew. In recognition perhaps of the delicate situation that arises
whan jealously guarded perogatives elbow one another, there was no gen-
eral understanding on the part of anyone on what constituted the articles
of organization or the charter of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, It r/as
orobably better that these were left unsaid or at least unadvertised,
and that the organization and procedure were permitted to evolve grad-
ually." 14/
A Havy version of the same event in historys
"One might gather from arguments heard later, when the so-called
Unification Bill was being considered by Congress, that there never had
been any real co-operation between the Army and Ilavy. The truth is that
k Nelson, Op. Cit. p. 397
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many problems common to both cervices had been solved satisfactorily
through the operation of a Joint Board "which dated back to 1903. The
President, foreseeing that events probably -would make it necessary for
him to exsrcise his Constitutional powers as Conniander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, had the Joint Board placed under his direction in 1939.
".
.
.When Prime Tiinister Churchill and his aides ca^e to Washing-
ton shortly after the var began in December 19hl, it Tras apparent that
the Joint Board had to be revised, zlv&n nore pawner, and placed on a
basis -where it could -;:ork side by side v-ith the alrecdy functioning
British Chiefs of Staff, Thus -was created the American Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 'Thich held its first meeting in February, 19U2, and -nhich
absorbed the functions of the old Joint Borrd.
The Joint Chiefs became the principal agency for Arry-Navy-Air
Force coordination* Its duties during the -war -were never defined pre-
cisely. I have heard that in some file there is a, • .memorandum from
Roosevelt, setting up the Joint Chiefs, but I never saw it, • .The
•Joint Chiefs of Staff -was an instrument of the Commander-in-Chief and
nas responsible to hin. I was his representative on that body. As
senior officer present, I ^resided at its meetings, prepared the agenda,
and signed all the major papers and decisions."^/
In addition to the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Co-
ordination of the defense effor the appointment of Fleet Admiral
Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Comriander-in-Chiof on July 20, I9l£ fol-
lowing the suggestion of General : larshr.ll. The most tportant function
£ Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, "I Was There" (Hew York, Whittlesey
House, UcGraTr-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19^0 ) pp. 101-102
.
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of the Chief of Staff T.ast
"the maintaining of dai'iy liaison between the President and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was my job to pass on to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff the basic thinking of the President on all -rar plans and
strategy. In turn I brought beck from the Joint Chiefs a concensus
of thoir thinking."6/
In addition to the internal reorganisational efforts in the TCar
and Navy Departments and the establishment of the Joint Chiefs and
Staffs and Fleet Admiral Leahy as Chief of Staff to the Ccrar.r>nder-in-
Chicf, there Tjere numerous other agencies evolved to correlate the
civilian and the defense effort during the war.




The fourth and major phase of the evolution of the Defense Org-
anisation -was the no-called Unification of the Arned Forces. As rill
be f?een !?ter in this chapter, "unification11 is the coianon terra used
to describe '- Defense Organisation established by the llational
Security Act of 19i:7.
As early as 30 August, 19hk9 Secretary of the I'cvy Forrostal -wrote:
"The question of a single Department of Dc: .1 do not thin!: for
a moment ivo m lata this ?J^;htly, r,nd I have so told Admiral King. "7/
On 18 April, 19l£ Secretary Forrcstal and Adriral Iling had a
meeting idLth President Truman, afWV Tdiich the Secretary -wrote:
"Single. Department of Defense : I mad* the suggestion that he ro-
! the r.orrorr Board Report Tith the thought that this form might be
followed in the study of the desirability of consolidating the tm>
Services. "8/
On 9 -&y, 19h£ Forrestr.l had luncheon for Admiral King, General
Marshall and Harry Hopkins:
"The purpose of that lunch iran to explore vrith King and *>.rshall
the possibility of the Ar;jy and IJavy reaching an af :t as to the
form of our postwar national defense.
"•
. .Harshall* • »«ld that he -.."as unshakably cocnitted to the
7 "alter Millis (Ed.), "The Forrcstal Diaries" (lev York, The Viking
ss, 19.r'l) p« 9




thesis of a single civilian Secretary TTith a single military Chief of
Staff. . .
«I y could » our in the cone I a
single department but vould c° • ±&X, Ally's vier on
any re io system of cooperation end GOOrdinatiDn**^'
On Hay 1;, 1?L£, In a looter of the Navy Forrestal,
Senator David I. walsh, Chaiivm, Coon ittee on Naval Affairs, stated:
"I feel quite sore JVtt v.lll agree j cfiree-tive
methods of coordination developed by tl: , ~rf9 ond the Air
Forces, duriiv; wo present vfeJF sho-.ld be continued in the post
It is realized that :;any good arguments can be presented both for and
against a consolidation of the present War and ITavy Departments into
a Depart tional Defense rrith sub-depart 9 land, naval,
and air forces, I a not convinced, r, such a consolidation
the best possible solution to the problem of coordinrtjng our defense
efforts. ,,ir)/
Senator V.'alsh then gave the pros and cons of a single Department
of Defense u he sarr it and suggested as an alternative to Unification
that a Council on National Defense bt created vrith the follorring stand-
ing co : dittoes in a staff capacity!
1, Joint Chiefs of Staff
2« Research CoirLidttee
3» Procuro^ent Comittee
9 Ibid, p. 60
10 ortTijiand Eberstadt, "Unification of T7ar and Navy Department and
-
ost?:ar Organisation for National Defense" (Washington, D. C# , U. S.
Government Printing Office, 19l£) p. HI
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h* Con dttee on Military -el
. Conmittee on Civil Personnel
Senator YalM cone Wt "I suggest that y
consi" ving the !Javy D thorough
stu.V o- J
'
^ether or not it - o desir-
able for it t ose the est, snt of a Council on Nrtional De-
fense as in alternative to the pr ondingr that the Army and
I Gonr- nt of Rational Defense. n11'
Secretary Fori-1 replied 1 -tter % 3 h on May
27, 19h^ in ; follorrs: "Tour " *f vij- WKTi la sub-
stantially to -drat in t MS in , »3 .'", ; set tl
.;/ Department cannot be in the position of nerely talcing the nega-
tive in this disc insion, but on the contrary 211st coaie up -with ^x>si-
tive and constructive recommendations. Certainly there are r>any gains
in Ar / coogK Q v/hich brve developed in this w.r and -which
should ,:ot be lost. Oat aide of the v iroly KLlltcry area, there MM
great lessons learned in the process of aobilizing the Nation's re-
sources for -war -which should be carefully recorded; the iiechanisaM of
socurin,; and die information of our industrial capa-
city, nor material stockpiles, etc., should be kept in being. w^2'
Shortly thereafter, on June 19, Y))£ Secretary Forrestal -wrote
Mr. Ferdinand Ilfceretadt
;
hi to ako a re a re-
port:
"• • .-with rec "itions on the follovdng nsattorwi
11 Ibid
. p. IV
12 EL p. V

-15-
nl. Would unification of tho Yfar and Navy Departaents under a
single head improve our national security?
"2. If not, what changes in osent relationships of the
military services and deportrients has our war experience indicated as
desirable to improve our national security?
"3* Y/hat form of postwar organization should be established and
maintained to enable the military services and other governmental de-
partments and agencies raos x effectively to provide for and protect our
national security?""*^'
In view of the magnitude of the job and the limited time available,
Sir, Hberstadt broke down the subject matter into topics and assigned
one individual responsibility of collecting and evaluating the back-
ground information and facts from published and unpublished documents
and reports and from correspondence and interviews Y/hile at the same
time retaining full responsibility for the studies and for the conclu-
sions and recomrjendations.
On conclusion of the study, Mr, Eberstadt forwarded his report to
Secretary Forrestal on Septerber 2£, 19U£ as an enclosure to a letter
in which he stated:
"Unitary efficiency is not the only condition Ti:ich should in-
fluence the form of our postwar military organization.. To be acceptable,
any such organization rnust fall rdthin the framework of our traditions
and castoms. It must be of such size and nature it to command public
support. It mast be aimed at curing the weaknesses disclosed in the
13 Ibid, o. 1
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lato wars. And finally, it must be conducive to fostering those pol-
icies and objectives -which contribute to the service and protection of
our national security. . .The military services are but a part of the
national machinery of peace or war. An effective national security
policy calls for active, intimate and continuous relationships not
alone between military services themselves, but also between the mil-
itary services and many other departments and agencies of government.
"• • «We have attempted to sketch the major organisations and re-
lationships -which are Involved in promoting the maintenance of peace
or, in default of this, in marshalling our national resources fully,
promptly, and effectively in our defense.
*We have suggested new organizational forms responsible to our norrr
world position, oar new international obligations, and the new techno-
logical developments emerging from the war.
"Throughout this report, we have kept in mind two major conditions
precedent to effective operation of any form of organization t
"1. That all organizational forms inust remain sufficiently flex-
ible not only to permit, but to encourage, such changes in method and
policy as are necessary to meet changing conditions.
n2. That experience does not indicate, nor study disclose, any




.Delivery of this report constitutes fulfillment of the task
outlined in your letter."1**/
1h Ibid, pp. 1-2
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On October 18, 19U£ Secretary Forrestal enclosed t copy of the
Eberstadt report in a letter to Senator 'v.'alsh in . hich he said:
". | »A great many of the opinions being voiced on both sides of
this question -were based upon extremely broad generalizations concern-
ing the experience of this country during the wr or upon a purely
prior reasoning. L§r oral mind "use not nearly so clear on the matter
except that I -was and I am certain that it is one of the gravest im-
portance to the Nation and one that shoald not be resolved -without the
most painstaking and exhaustive examination of all the frets bearing
upon the problem*
"His report. • .brings to the fore many factual considerations
Tihich have tended to be all too easily overlooked in such public dis-
cussions of the natter. "1^/
On 20 December, 19U£ President Truman sent a message to the 79th
Congress calling for consolidation of the amed forces tad the creation
of a single Department of Defense. This request resulted in the creation
of a special sub-committee of the Senate liilitary Affairs Cormittee to
write a bill for the unificati »n of the Armed Forces. The resultant
bill (knovm as the Thomas Bill, named after Senator Elbert D. Thomas
of Utah) was introduced to Congress on 9 April 19U6. This Bill pro-
vided for a relatively centralised Department of Defense headed by a
Secretary, Under-Secretary, and four functional assistant Secretaries,
and vdth three Secretaries for Yfar, Air, and Navy.
Hearings sorted on the Thomas Bill on 1 lay, 19U6.
1$ Ibid, p. VI
•;-.-.
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lose hearings, conducted in public through the first weeks of
llay, isEsediately brought the fires of controversy, which had been
smoldering behind the curtains of official reticence, to fine blase.
Forrestal appeared before the committee on llay !• • ,His central point
was that the Thomas Bill, -while setting up an organization?.! structure,
had not really thought thro / of the specific and very practical
problems of organization -with vhich that structure would have to deal;
though loich more elaborate than the simple pflP Is originally ad-
vanced by the Army, it still rested on the premise of * o now and
organize later, • n^-c'
It was obvious at this tlfft that the President's message to Con-
gress on 20 December, 19Uf? was sent without agreement within his rdnin-
istration on the method of unification. In view of the controversy
raging due to the open hearings on the Thomas Bill, President tram
called a IThite House conference on 13 ~:ay, 19li6 of his civilian and
military leaders of his defense organization,
"The President said he -would lnJ:e -he Army and Navy to get to-
gether to identify their points of agreement and disagreement with re-
gard to legislation looking to coordination of the two Departments.
He said ha was not prejudiced in favor of one Service or the other —
what he wanted was a balanced system of national defense with parti-
cular reference to the integration of the budget. . •
"The President asked Adrdral Leahy his views and Adriral Leahy
said he thought something could be woriced out provided the proposed
3£ ><>. Cit. p. 1$9
•.
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bill eli inated the single Chief of Staff. lie said his experience dur-
ing the war had convinced Ida that the idea of a single Chief of Staff
was dangerous* . .Actiral Leahy added that he thought the sphere of act-
ivities of naval aviation could be worked out by agreement. On the fut-
ure position and scope of the activities of the iriarines, he stated that
he was inclined to agree with the views of General Eisenhower. • .(that
"while he did not favor siaintaining two different amies "with the same
missions, he weald be the last to advocate the 'abolition1 of the Mar-
ines.)
"When the President asked the Secretary of War for his comments,
Patterson replied. • .that he still felt the greatest efficiency would
be obtained by the formation of a single Department, with a single Sec-
retary and a single Chief of Staff. • •
n
* . .(This meeting represented a decisive victory for Forrcstr.l,
largely reversing the effects of the defeat he had suffered in Dece -
ber with the President's initial message on unification. • .Eis chosen
tactics of patient pressure, persuasion, and, above all, a thorough
grounding in the essentials of the problem and a complete understanding
of all the factors that were in it, had paid off. The President had
coi^e around to view that a single Chief of Staff was 'dangerous 1
. • .
If in the end Forrestal was largely the winner in the unification fight,
it was because he had thought rJore deeply, be< lie liad enlisted Eber-
stadt and others to think for him, because he had looked at the real and
central problems involved rather than accepted qic 1.: solutions which
under the test of tirae and events could not stand.)"1''
17 mills, Op. Cit. pp. 160-162
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Following this :neeting with Jic President, the "avy and Army
civilia .itary ler ot together to try and reach a conpro-
mice solution to the unification problem to aeet the President's dead-
line of llay 31* As a result, the UNI Wt differences were narror.-: .
The Arr.y acceded to the idea 01 Council of "o on Defense (National
Security Council), a National Security Resources Board, a Central
diligence Agency, and a Munitions Board and gave up pressing for a
single Department of Defense with a Chief of Staff for the Secretary
01 Defense and a straight line of comrjand of the Service Departments.
The only roraining raj or point of difference ivas the powers to be giv-
en to the Secretary cf Defense, i.e., coordination (Havy view) versus
administrative control (Any view), -linor points of difference vjere
tlie Arny* s resistance en the Air Force responsibility for all air re-
sources and United functions of the Marine Corps* It is interesting
to note that the Havy not only opposed giving up its air > the new-
Air Porce but also to the Ar.y's idea of giving up its own troop sup-
port- air arm to the now Air Foi";e.
On 31 TJay, I9I16 the Secretaries of War and Mavy -wrote a joint
letter to the President outlining .reas of agreement and disagree-
On l£ June, 19l*6 President rote a letter to Congress lay-
ing down a twelve point program on which unification b! b-
lished. However, Congress convene. ! out taking action on unifica-
tion.
On 16 January, 19^7, the Secretaries of r'ar and !!avy sent a joint
letter to President Truman reconciling Arry and Havy views on the int-
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egretion of the Armed Services.
On 26 February V)Ifl, reside. ! a unification bill
(S 7£C) to '..he Senate, having been drafted by -opi-csentatives of
the ar.ed services and having the approval of the Secretaries c
and 'Jctj M Joint Chiefs «£f* This Bill IBM referred to t>
Co :ittee on Ar.ied Services on 3 I , !?':?•
Hearing started on 1 , 19hi and lasted ten reeks, afforded
a full opportunity to the representative;: of all government
and agencies and "bo all private citizens to be heard. This public
hearing was folio ec"1 by executive sessiona of the Armed Services Conn-
ittee starting on 20 I-ay, 3$hl which nated in a vote of 12 to
fox the bill on h June 19u7.
On 25 July 19U7 Congress passed the National Security Act of 19U7
(Public Law 2£3 - COth Congress). On 26 July 19hl President Trunan
signed this act and aL mi ti^ie si pied an Ssecutive Order defer-
ring tiie roles and missions of the Services and appointed Secretary of
the Eavy Forroc i the first Secretary of Defense.
In terns of the Senate B
"This act has been designed to provide a comprehensive program for
the Mature security of the United Sta Ufa It o»i thla fey provisions
involving three levels of the Govermient. On the highest level, under
the jupervision of the President, it provides for the ostab-
lishment of integrated policies and procedures for th.. :>
y
ageiicies end function:, of the uovernDQirt relating to t -ional Sec-
urity. On a lovrer level, it orovi.'os for three independently ad JLni-
stercd rdlita:<y departments, and provides further for their authori-






lf it .provides for Ihe
effective grt of the Armed , for their 07 *.an
under ontrol, end for tlieir inter: b team
of land, naval, and air forces.
•31 ... ' the need "or lew Ml continuous coordi-
nation on a hi£h lovol within the £Ju»wrjjuuent of oar -tic, ; :,
an-" y polid , fer ^ropriate Sxct geee organization to
serve both itdllt civil! .ci B if -^y, and for vastly
roved pleasing for control and tttili 1 of our natural and indus-
trial resources 1x3 of em ,. w
'
In brief, the National Security J ! 19u7 pro-;
'
Sec. 2 Declaration of Policy
Title I "ooruin- tio.. for Nation
Sec. 101 . 12I Sc -inci!
Cqepeeed of tt) :ident, fcfci Secretary of State, the
Sec f of Defense, the Secretaries of the Arr , yy,
and Air Force, and Chairnan of the national Securities
Resources Board and such other members as the .resident
iaay designate. An advisory tody to the Hminimi -rith
;t to the tnt tan of domestic, forei , .d id.1-
ry policl-i, 1 o le the 1 llitarjr services
". the other <3 be and nt
18 U# S. Congress, "Senate Co ontttee on Armed Services Report on the
national Security Act of 19U7" (Vr'ashington, D. C, U. S. Govern-
nesb ranting Office) p. 15
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to cooperate more effectively in matters involving nat-
ional security.
Sec. 102 Central Intelligence Agency
Under the National Security Council with supervisory
authority and responsibility then exercised by the Nat-
ional Intelligence Authority created by Executive Order
of the "resident.
Sec. 103 National Security Resources Board
To advise the .resident concerning the coordination of
military, industrial, and civilian mobilization and thus
provide him and the II* S. C. -with a sound and realistic
basis on -which to evaluate the objectives, committments,
and risks they must consider in connection with our dom-
estic, military, and foreign policies.
Title II - The national laiitary Establishment
Sec. 201 National Military Establishment
A National Military Establishment consisting of the De-
partments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, together "with
certain agencies to assist in the coordination of the act-
ivities of these Departments - headed by the Secretary of
Defense tot
"1. Establish general policies and programs for the
National :Ulitary Establishment and for all departments and
agencies therein.
"2. Exercise general direction, authority, and con-
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trol over such departments and agencies.
"3. Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecess-
ary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procure-
ment, supply, transportation, storage, health, and re-
search,
"U. Supervise and coordinate the preparation of
the budget estimates of the departments and agencies coxa-
prising the national Military Establishment: formulate
and determine the budget estlmat-es for submittal to the
Bureau of the Budget j and supervise the budget programs
of such departments and agencies under the applicable
19/
appropriation Act."
Sec. 203 Military Assistants to the Secretary
"Officers of the Armed Services may be detailed to duty
as assistants and personal aides to the Secretary of
Defense, but he shall not establish a military staff."20/
Sec. 20U Civilian Personnel
Three special assistants.
Sec. 20£ Department of the Army
Changed name from Department of "war.
Sec. 206 Department of the llavy
llaval aviation integrated -with the naval service.
Navy responsible for naval reconnaissance, anti-
submarine Tjarfare, and protection of shipping.
Marine Corps to develop landing force amphibious





Sec. 207 Department of the Air Force
Established as an executive department.
Sec. 208 United States Air Force
Composed of the former Any Air Forces, the Air Corps,
U. S. Army and General Headquarters, Air Force (Air
Force Combat Command).
Sec. 209 Effective Dato of Transfer
Sec. 210 War Council
To advise the Secretary of Defense on matters of broad
policy relating to the armed services. Composed of the
Secretary of Defense as chairman with powers of decision,
the Secretaries of the Army, Kavy and Air Force, the
Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, and the Chief
of Haval Operations.
Sec. 211 Joint Chiefs of Staff
To consist of Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Chief of liaval
Operations, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force and the Chief
of Staff to the Comrjander-in-Chief, if there is one.
Duties: to prepare strategic and logistic plans, estab-
lish unified commands, formulate policies for joint train-
ing of the military forces and for coordinating the edu-
cation of members of the military forces, to review mat-
erial and personnel requirements of the Armed Forces,
provide military representation in the United Nations, act




Sec, 212 Joint Staff
Operating under a Director - total not to exceed 100 -
composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from
each of the three armed services.
See. 213 Munitions Board
Replaced Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board
Sec. 211i Research and Development Board
Replaced the Joint Research and Developrient Board
Title IH - Lliscellaneous




The fourth and final phase of the evolution of the Defense Organi-
zation Tiras the Modifications of the unified organization established by
the National Security Act of 19U7« These modifications were*
National Security Act Amendments of 19h9
National Security Act Amendments of 19^2
Reorganization Plans 3 and 6 of 19!?3
As seen in the previous chapter, the National Security Act of 19U7
(coianonly called the Unification Act) v/as based on the Navy's theory of
organization) centralized responsibility (Secretary of Defense) and de-
centralized authority (Departments of Arrjy, Navy, and Air Force, Muni-
tions Board, Research and Development Board* National Resources Board,
etc*) It mus "what Forrestal had -wanted as a result of the Eberstadt
Report.
During the reminder of 19U7 and the year of X9U8, Forrestal grad-
ually got the complicated Defense Organization In notion, based on the
philosophy of making changes only xhere needed and not just for the sake
of making a change. Certain minor deficiencies in the Organization cans
to the surface, such as the overlapping of the various boards. But the
major deficiency in the organization turned out to be centered in the
Secretary of Defense — he did not have the authority to match his re-
sponsibility. The vehicle to prove this organization dilenna to Forres-
tal T7as the Defense budget.
Another area of indecision in the Defense Organization vhm the sub-
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ject of roles and missions. Congress had purposely avoided defining the
roles and missions of the Services, considering these an administrative
matter, a function of the iSxecutive Department. Troubles in this area
were partially solved by the Hoy Jest Conferences, 11-lh Ilarch, 19U8,
the Spaatz-TowBT Report, and the Uewport Conference, 20-22 August, 19US.
During the summer of 19h$ the Committee on the Uational Security
Organization (a task force of the ((Hoover)) Commission on Organization
of the Executive Branch of the Government) began their hearings under
the ciiairmanship ox Ferdinand Sberstadt, the architect of the organiza-
tion that was being analyzed* This com -ittee submitted its report with
recommendations to the Comdsyion on ?£ Itoveiaber, 19k3«
A summary of the Report and Recommendations of this Committee fol-
lowsi
"The essence of the Committee's task was to explore how the products
of our national security establishment could bo iriproved and, at the
same time, the costs reduced — how to obtain the maxiiium sec rity at the
mtnlninn cost in terms of our resources and liberties. • •
*• • .Efficiency and economy are dependent upon the wisdom and abil-
ity of tks men entrusted with its control and upon a spirit of mutual
loyalty, teamwork, and unioy of purpose throughout the organization. No
organization is any better than the men who run itj a neat organizational
chart is not a panacea for all ills. Optimum efficiency can be achieved
only as the product of education and experience over a long period of
time. Evolutionary processes, rather than revolutionary ones. • •
"Our present system, croatec- by the National Security Act of 19li7,
is a long step forward. In terns of progress, compared with what exist-

ed at the beginning, or even at tfag end, e .'ar H, the advances
have been considerable. However, in tcm3 of securing the legitimate
interests of the United States -without threat of militarization of our
society, and finally, in terras of laaxLium security at lainijaum cost, the
present product of the jystem can be substantially improved. The United
States is imquesbionable far better ptmptc ed to deal Tdth the complex
problems of foreign and military policy, mobilization, and national de-
fense than ever be ;. ftm costs, at the same time,
of its security organiza re enormously greater, both absolutely and
in relation to the national income, than over before.
"Its investigations convinced the r/ommitteo tliat there are six
areas or aspects in v;Iiich improvement in the interest of greater effi-
ciency and economy is both possible and necessary.
"They involve:
"1. Strengthening central authority in the military establishment!
"2. Overhauling tlie military budget}
"3. Improving teamwork throughout the National Security Organiza-
tion}
"lu Relating scientific research and development more closely to
strategic planning}
"£ Expediting plans for civilian. • .mobilization. . ,j
"6. Making adequate provisions for and against ne\. and unconven-
tional means of warfare.
"The Committee considered and rejected!





*2. Iterger of the three military departments into a single depart-
ment; and
"3« lierger of the naval air KFU ._ force," '
After receiving the various Cxrittee (Task Force) Reports and Re-
commendations, '.tted its norr famous composite
report to Congress ai 5 February, 19l#« Its recommendations -were for
more authority for the Secretary of Defence including the budget and
expenditures, bet-tir t throughout th lonal imtlitary estab-
lishment, better coordination of medical services, and ton of
emergency plans for civilian and industrial iiobilizatian. The Co. xdss-
ion concluded*
"These provisions should i the full control and accountability
of the national Military Establishment and the full subordination of
the military to civilian control by establish:*Jig the Secretary of De-
fense as the principal assistant to the President in military matters,
responsible to hin and to the Congress for the conduct, efficiency, and
and econo:^ of the National !.!ilitary 3ctablishment» Lines of command
v/ould be clear| interservice rivalries reduced by the fresh emphasis on
the singleness of purpose of the total military effort; efficiency ore—
noted and economy achieved tlirough consistent policy and program, and
through centralized control."22'
The Congressional hearings on the amendments to the national Sec-
21 The Committee on tional Security Organisation, "Task Force
Report on national Security Organization, (T.ashington, D. C«, U# S,
Government .Printing Office, January, l°h°) pp. 2-9.
22 Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
"The Hoover Co mission Report", (llerr York, McGraw-II ill, 19h9) p« 197.
•
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urity Act started soon after the submission of the Commission Report.
These hearings produced a replica of the Unification fight -with the Airy-
Air Force coalition pitted against the Navy. Forrestal's moderation
saved the day. As a res-alt of these hearings Congress passed the Nat-
ional Security Act Amendments of 19U9, Public Law 216 —61st Congress,
These Amendments provided for;
"Change in composition of the National Security Council.
"Conversion of the National Military Establishment into an Exec-
utive Department.
"Conversion of the Departments of Army, llavy, and Air Force to
military departments in lieu of executive departments.
"Provided for a Deputy and three assistant Secretaries of Defense.
"Created the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
"Increased limit of Joint Staff from 100 to 210.
"Changed the relationship of the Secretary of Defense to the H&in-
itions Board and Research and Development Board.
"Established uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures and organi-
zations (Title I7)B23/
The major significance of the National Security Amendments of 191#
was that there was no change in the pattern, i.e., an organisation by
evolution at a time of great unrest by the American populace at the
realization of the heavy burden of peacetime defense after the sacri-
fices of the greatest war known to man.
With the exception of minor lam passed by the 82nd Congress in
23 U. S. Congress, "National Security Act Amendments of 19k9" (Wash-
ington, D. C, U. S. Government Printing Office, 19h9)
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195>2 (The Defense Supply Management Agency and Office of Director of
Installations), all tos quiet on the Defense Organization front until
the ad-vent of the Rockefeller Peoort: "Committe3 on Department of De-
fense Organisation" on April 11, 19^3 • This Tms followed by President
Eisenhower's message to Congress on 30 April 19E>3 on the reorganization
of the Defense Organization including studies on the internal organiza-
tion of the Service Departments.
FoUordng hearings before the CornmitteG on Government Operations
in June, 1953, Reorganization Plan 6 became lair under provision of the
Reorganization Act of 19li9, as amended and placed in effect in the De-
partment of Defense by D. 0, Dm Directive 3>10£»1 of 30 June, 19^3.
"In his message to Congress on the Plan, President Eisenhower
enumerated three objectives to be achieved!
"1. To clarify lines of authority so as to strengthen civilian
ros">onsibility•
"2« Effectiveness -with econoi'y.
"3« To improve our machinery for strategic planning."2^
As a result of this Reorganization Plan, six new assistant Sec-
retaries of Defense vere added, as staff advisers to the Secretary of
Defense, absorption of the functions of the Research and Development
Board, Munitions Board, Defense SupoOy Management Agency, and office
of the Director of Installations in the Secretary of Defense's office,
transfer of the National Security Resources Board statutory functions
to the office of Defence Mobilization, under Reorganization Plan 3 of
2k John R. Probert, "Pentagon Reorganization! Phase Three", U» S. Naval
Institute Proceedings. (Vol, 81, IJo. 1, January V)<$) p. *3
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19^3) and placed tho Joint .Staff under the Ghainaan of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
"In summary, then, the Deaartraont of Defense has beccrae, Trith Re-
organization i/lan 6, rare like tlie other executive departments* The
Secretary's staff has been expanded. • .and authority and responsibi-
lity has been r.oro precisely* located in it, so that it can more effect-
ively assist him in controlling the colossus for T*±ch he is responsi-
ble. At the same time, operations and much administration have remained
decentralized under the Service Secretaries. Though the very contro-
versial transfer of management functions over the Joint Staff to the
chairman has reduced the porrer of the other morabers of tho Joint Chiefs,
they have not been submerged or subordinated."V
In his message to Congress submitting Reorganization Plan 6, he
indicated that Improvements could be made in the Depart unts of the
Army, llavy, and Air Force Organizations. Accordingly the Secretary of
Defense asked each o dlitary services to study and report on its
organisational problems with t vierr tovard obtaining greater effective-
ness and economies -nherever possible.
The following reports -wore submitted as a result of these studies:
Gates Report: Report of tho Committee on Organization of tho De-
partment of the Havy, 16 April 195k.
Davles Report: Organization of the Army. 13 December, 19^3 fol-
lowed by r~nr*+.^r nr -hhe Arry's Plan for Amy Organization, lit June
2$ Ibid, n. 62
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iVhite Report: Report to the Secretary of the Air Force *
The jnajor effect of these reoorts ims the enactment of a bill by
Congress on 3 August, 19£U of a bill authorising each Military Depart-




The preceding chapters have traced the evolution of the defense org-
anization of the United States from the American Revolution to the pre-
sent day* This historical approach has shown the underlying reasons for
what is contained in the defense laws and directives, and "what is not
contained in the laws and directives* With this background, it is poss-
ible to oonder the future possibilities of changes in the Defense Org-
anization and at the same time to delve deeper and study the intent of
the lawmakers} the intent of Congress, in this case*
Tl/hat is the intent of Congress as regards our Defense Or oion?
The Policy Section of the "National Security Act of 1$>1j7 as Amended"
reads as follows
s
"It is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program
for the future security of the United States} to provide for the estab-
lishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agen-
cies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security}
to provide three military departments, separately administered, for the
operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including Haval Avia-
tion and the United States Ilarine Corps), and the Air Force, with their
assigned corbat and service components} to provide for their authorita-
tive coordination and unified direction under civilian control of the
Secretary of Defense, but not to merge them} to provide for the effect-
ive strategic direction of naed forces and for their operation




of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of
Staff over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff (but this
is not to be interpreted as applying to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or
Joint Staff, )»26/
That is a straightforward declaration on the part of Congress and
one that leaves no doubt as to their intentions. And how is this intent
of Congress brought to fruition? By the people in the Organization
created by the Congress to carry out their policies on national defense.
The major benefit to the country of this defense organisation has
been the high level integration of policies and procedures for the de-
partments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to the
national security. The complexity of our modern civilization demands
a high level integration of our various national policies: foreign,
itary, and economic* Prior to enact!aent of the National Security
Act of 19U7, high level integration of our foreign and military policy
•was haphazard, and as a result our foreign policy often was not backed
by military reality. This influence of the national Security Council
and the Defense Department on our national Policies has led to fears
of militarism, but Congress has always safeguarded this by the check-
rein of civilian control,
"The solo basis for the necessity of civilian control over the
military is, • .the necessity for elected representatives of the peor>le
to control a ready-made instrument of great porrer and potential danger
In a society. , ,In the Unitet is, the Constitu ^kes very thor-
26 U. S. Congress, Public Law 216 - 81st Congress, "luitional Security
Act of 19U7 as Amended* Sec, 2
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ough provision for civilian control of the Armed Forces. Surely every
American knows full -well that the President is Commandei^In-Chief of
the U. S. Amed Forces $ perhaps not as T/idely understood is the fact
that corplinentary, and probably more powerful, control is exercised
by Congress, "which is charged -with raising, supporting, and regulating
the Armed Forces, Congress has never been backward about carrying out
this proper and necessary civilian control function."^/
Thus the basic philosophy of our post T'orld Y.ar II Defense Organi-
zation as derived fro the 2nN of Congress is a bigger voice for the
Defense Organization in the determination of our National Policies, at
the same time ineT-jasing the civilian control over the military,
A possible second major benefit to our country of this relatively
ner defense organisation is faith of the country in the system duo to
the evolutionary process by -which the organization cane into being.
The long and heavily debated case for unification -was carried out in
the true democratic traditions of open forum. At the tire it may have
been feared that the resultant organization night have been hamstrung
by the bitter pros and cons aired, but acceptance was the ultirate re-
nard.
A third possible major benifit to our country is economy of resources;
money, and material. One of the major objectives of the National
Defense Act as amended is economy. But any effort to measure or define
economy in relation to our defense effort has resulted in an exercise in
27 Lt. Col. Anthony Wermth, U. S. Army, "Civilian Control of the Armed




•mantics. Moreover, the question of economy is of a continuing nature
rather than an instantaneous savings* The objective is to oreserve the
peace vtithout breaking the country*
And -nhat about the future? If the present trend of centralization
continues and Parkinson's Law2"/ holds true, the end result may be a gov-
ernmental administrative giant of new and unbelievable proportions. On
the other hand, the trend towards centralization of responsibility and
authority in the Department of Defense may have passed its zenith. The
latest change in the defense department organization was the addition
of two assistant secretaries in each Service Department and the latest
recommendation is to reduce the number of assistant Secretaries of De-
fense fro*! nine to six. " This i3 in contrast to the theory of Oime
Lewis on leaving the Department of Interior as an Assistant Secrctaiy*
He -was wof the ooinion that not enough has been added upstairs in the
structure of the government to take care of the great exoansion below*
I think there should be more assistant secretaries*"-* /
IIow3ver, Secretary of Defense V/jlson see is determined to hold the
line, as evidenced by his refusal to support a proposal to promote the
general counsels of each Service Department to assistant secretaryshi .
In conclusion, the future of the Defense Organization should be
one of stability* This era of stability should give each element of the
Organization a chance to Improve its performance. And with improved
2^ The Scono:i.st* November 19, 19^5
29 A Report to the Congress by the Co: l -issioa on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government, "Business Organization of the
Department of Defense" (b'r.shington D, C, U. S* Govern ring-
ing Office) June, V)<$ p. 21
30 The Sunday Star, Washington D. C*, August 1°££ p. A-19
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performance should co >roved efficiency — riore defense per tax
dollar. Assuming that the trend toward centralization is over, the
future emohasis will be on econoiry in the long haul. And the center
of interest will be our double AA Janus of Aviation and the Atom.
Assuming that we have the air power and the stockpile of atom weapons
to annihilate the eneBor and vice versa, is the quantitative differen-
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